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Abstract—Today, trust modelling is a serious issue on the
social web. Social web allows information exchange between
anonymous users who have no prior knowledge to each other.
The aim of a trust model is to rerank acquired information
according to their reliability and the trustworthiness of their
author. During the last decade, trust models were proposed to
assist the user to state his opinion about the acquired information,
and about their sources. We identify three paradigms for trust
modelling: the first relies on evaluating previous interactions with
the source (individual trust), the second relies on the word of
mouth paradigm where the user relies on the knowledge of his
friends and their friends (collective trust), and the third relies
on the reputation of the source (global trust). In this paper, we
propose and compare three trust models, each of which represent
one of the precedent paradigms. All three models make use of
subjective logic (SL). SL is an extension of probabilistic logic that
deals with the cases of lack of evidence. It supplies framework
for modelling trust on the web. The comparison includes three
axes: the precision, the complexity and the robustness to malicious
attacks. We show that each of the three models has a weak point
in one of the three axes.
Keywords—Trust modelling, Subjective logic, Collective trust,
global trust, local trust, reputation
I. I NTRODUCTION
Web 1.0 provided a popular access to the largest data
store ever existed (Internet). The major difficulty residedin
extracting relevant information and resources from the huge
mass of data available for most queries. Information retrieval
(IR) came out to yield Internet more efficient and exploitable
by ranking resources according to their relevance to queries.
Then, web 2.0 arrived with more interactive tools such as
forums and social networks. The numerous people who were
only the spectators in web 1.0, became the actors in web 2.0.
They are now able to share their own opinions and knowledge.
Collaborative IR and social recommender systems (RS) [34]
are now used to rank this kind of resources.
Web 2.0 provides a highly connected social environment.
It allows data exchange among anonymous people from all
around the world. Acquiring information from such sources
raises the question about its reliability and trustworthiness.
Modelling social trust into computational trust appeared to
overcome the trustworthiness problem (for both information
and resources). Today, computational trust is integrated in
many domains and contexts such as social networks, rec-
ommender systems [4], [25], file sharing [22], multi-agents
systems [31] etc.
We consider social trust as the belief of an individual,
called truster, that another individual, called trustee, has the
competence and the willingness to either execute a task to
the favour of the truster, or to assist him to execute it. The
assistance can simply be recommending another individual to
execute the task. The truster tries to acquire information and
constructs his own belief about the trustee before decidingto
cooperate with him [1].
Building truster’s opinion about the trustee is mainly
derived by three means; the first is by exploiting previous
interactions between both of them, so the truster relies on
his own knowledge about the trustee (individual opinion).
The second uses the word of mouth mechanism, where the
truster exploits the collective knowledge of his trustee fri nds
and their friends (collective opinion). The third is by relying
on a global reputation score associated to the trustee (global
opinions).
Our objective in this paper is to propose and compare
three trust models based on the three types of opinions. A
local trust model that uses the individual opinions when they
are available, and collective opinions otherwise. A collectiv
trust model that uses strictly collective opinions. A global
trust model that uses only global opinions. We evaluate these
three models from the perspective of precision, complexity,
and robustness to malicious attacks. All our models use a
framework of subjective logic (SL) [17], which is an extension
of probabilistic logic, based on the belief theory [24], [23]. SL
provides a flexible framework form modelling trust [1], [2].
The object of our comparison is the dataset stackexchange
[16]. It is a social website based on a question answering
platform to assist users to find answers to their questions
in diverse domains (programming, mathematics, English lan-
guage, cooking, etc.). We assume that proposing an answer is
a proof of willingness to assist the person asking. Therefore,
our objective is to find the user capable to provide the most
relevant answer.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we present
the general framework, starting by presenting social trustand
computational trust. In II-C, we introduce subjective logic and
some of its operators. In Section III, we detail the three
proposed models. In Section IV, we describe the used dataset,
and present our interpretation of the success and the failure of
an interaction according to current data structure. In Section V,
we discuss the results of the three axes of comparison. Finally,
in Section VI, we resume our conclusions and future work.
II. GENERAL FRAMEWORK
The objective of trust is to find the appropriate person
to cooperate with in order to achieve a given task. Truster’s
decision about to cooperate or not is influenced by many
factors such as: the context, the completeness of his opinion
about the trustee, the reputation of the trustee, the emergency
of the task for him, and many more. In the following section,
we present a real life example about trust in order to explain
this phenomena, and some factors that can influence the
cooperation decision.
Suppose that Alice wants to paint her house. She publishes
this information and receives three offers from three profes-
sional candidates (Eric, Fred and George)willing to do the
job for her. She already knows Eric because he painted her
clinic sometime ago. Alice does not know neither Fred nor
George. If Alice is satisfied by the job of Eric in her clinic,
she might hire him for the house directly, and ignore the offers
of Fred and George. Nevertheless, if Alice is perfectionist, she
will investigate about them. Alice can ask her friends (Bob
and Caroline) about Fred and George. She also might use a
referential organization that classifies painters, or any other
mean to acquire informations about the reputation of the thre
painters.
Suppose that Bob says that Fred is a good professional.
Caroline says that she recently hired George to paint her house
and she is not satisfied about his work, whereas her sister Diana
has hired Fred and was satisfied. Note that even though Alice
trusts Bob and Caroline, she will not ask any of them to paint
her house, because she thinks that theylack competencein this
domain. Even so, they are still capable to play an important
role as advisers or recommenders.
After the suggestions of Bob and Caroline, Alice will
eliminate George and choose between Eric and Fred.
In this scenario, Alice asked her friends only about the
candidates that she herself does not know. But the scenario
could have been changed if she asked them also about Eric.
Bob could say for example that Eric is good for concrete walls
used in Alice’s clinic, but he is not very competent for wooden
walls like those of Alice’s house. This information can be
sufficient to convince Alice to hire Fred instead of Eric.
This example shows the limit of direct interactions manner,
and that the word of mouth may be useful to enrich the
knowledge of the truster about the trustee. It can lead to
sharpen his decision even when he thinks that his own acquired
knowledge is sufficient to take a decision.
In another scenario, Alice could simply search for the best
ranked painter referenced by specialised magazine, syndicate,
or other organization. Usually, these rankers track all the
interactions of their target, and use his entire history to perform
their ranking. As we can see in fig. 1, neither local nor
collective trust model would allow Alice to get use of the
interaction of Henry with Fred, as no path connects her to
Henry. The global trust models use the opinions of all the
users about Fred regardless if Alice trust them or not. Global
opinions are based on a larger number of interactions. Note tha
the active user has no control on the users who participate in
building this kind of opinions for him. His own opinion about











Fig. 1: Trust network
Furthermore, the current example allows us to distinguish
four types of trust relationships; these types are also discussed
in [28]:
1) Direct trust: trust is the result of interactions between
exclusively the truster and trustee, such as the rela-
tions ”Alice Bob” and ”Alice Eric”.
2) Indirect trust: the two persons do not know each
other. Trust is established due to trustee intermediate
persons, such as the relation ”Alice Fred”.
3) Functional trust: the expectation of the truster is that
the trustee accomplishes the task himself, such as
the relation ”Alice Eric”, ”Alice Fred” and ”Alice
George”.
4) Referential trust: the expectation of the truster is that
the trustee will recommend someone to accomplish
the task, such as the relation ”Alice Bob” and ”Alice
Caroline”. Note that the recommendation of Caroline
is also based on her referential trust in her sister
Diana. In other words, no obligation for the trustee
in referential trust to base his recommendation on a
functional trust relation. Normally, a series of referen-
tial trust relations must end with one functional trust
relation [29].
Fig. 1 illustrates the trust network used by Alice to make
her decision.
In the next section, we discuss the formalization of social
trust for the social web, and compare the different models that
exist.
A. Computational trust
Computational trust raised in the last decade to ensure
trust awareness in intelligent systems. It usually consists of
a formalization of social trust adjusted to specific contextand
application. Basically, computational trust has three axes [18]:
• Quantitative, also called global-trust or reputation: the
system computes a score for each user, this score
represents his global trustworthiness. This score is
considered when any other user needs to interact with
this user [20].
• Qualitative, also called local-trust or relationship: it
takes into account the personal bias. It is represented
as user to user relationship. It is the trustworthiness
of a user Y from the point of view of one single user
X [20].
• Process driven (system): it represents the trust of the
users in the system [18].
This work focuses on the qualitative and quantitative axes.
Most local trust models [4], [21], [19], [26] tend to formulate
local trust problem in the form of a trust network. A trust
network is a directed weighted graph where vertices represent
users, and edges represent trust relationships. Models differ
by their notation of edges, and their strategies in traversing
the network to compute trust between two unconnected users.
This operation is called Trust propagation. It is fundamental in
local trust models, as it allows to estimate how much a userA
(called source node) should trust a userB (called destination
node).
Global trust models [32], [22] associate a score of reputa-
tion to each user. This same score is used in all the interactions
where this user is implicated as a trustee. These models do not
take the personal bias into consideration, so a reputed useris
reputed to everybody and vice versa.
Local trust models suffer from a cold start problem, they
can not deal neither with new users nor with users having
no friends [2]. Global trust models are not concerned by this
problem. Nevertheless, it is difficult for new users to buildtheir
own reputation in a global trust model, since ancient reputed
users are usually more susceptible to be recommended by the
system.
As most social applications, social recommender systems
are exposed to different types of malicious attacks [14],
[33]. Malicious attackers aim to take the control over the
recommender system for different purposes, such as driving
the system to recommend or to oppose to the recommendation
of given items, inserting viruses, spam or advertises, etc.
Trust-aware recommenders are more robust than other
recommenders for most attacks [35]. Nevertheless, they are
not completely immune to all kinds of malicious attacks, such
as group attacks [36] which is always possible in some trust
models.
Computational trust is applied to many fields in artificial in-
telligence, recommender systems, file sharing, Spam detection,
networks security, etc. Most computational models are fitted
to their application fields and context. Basically, we identify
two categories. Models dealing only with trust relationship ,
and models dealing with trust and distrust relationships.
The first category contains numerous models such as [7],
[3], [8], [5], [6], [9]. The main disadvantage of this category is
that models do not distinguish between distrusted and unknown
persons. Social systems have to give chances to new and
unknown users to prove their trustworthiness, whereas it must
be more severe in blocking distrusted and malicious users
[15]. Unknown users are often new users, a system unable to
distinguish them from distrusted users risk to be very severe
with them, so discourage the evolution of the trust network,
to be so tolerant even with distrusted users, so less efficient.
Models in the second category distinguish between un-
known and distrusted people. Models in [11], [12], [13], [28],
[10], identify three possible cases: trust, distrust and igorance.
Authors in [10] classify these models into two groups; gradual
models [11], [12], [10] and probabilistic models [13], [28].
Gradual representation of trust is more similar to the human
way in expressing trust, whereas probabilistic representatio is
more meaningful mathematically.
We use SL [28], [17] in our models. Our choice is
motivated by many factors. SL considers trust ignorance and
distrust relationships, which is compatible with our need to
distinguish between unknown and distrusted people. Most
other trust models consider the creation and the evolution
of trust links as an external issue, they describe and deal
with existing links. SL is more transparent about this issue,
trust relationships in SL are based on the accumulation of
interactions between a couple of users. It proposes many
operators that allow to integrate many aspects and factors of
trust, which make it one of the most generic and flexible trust
models.
It is based on the belief theory [24], [23], which offers the
capacity to aggregate many beliefs coming from many sources
(even contradictory ones), which corresponds to the case when
a user has to aggregate the opinions of many friends of him
about a given problem.
Nevertheless, we compare them to referential model called
MoleTrust [4]. This model has been frequently used in the
trust based recommendation, and proved its quality in this
domain, and surpassed the collaborative filtering in the term
of performance. We explain it in the following Section II-B,
before proceeding to the Section II-C which is dedicated to
explain the structure and some operators of subjective logic.
B. MoleTrust
Moletrust was presented in{massa04. It considers that each
user has a domain of trust, where he adds his trustee friends
to. User can either fully trust other user or not trust him at
all. The model considers that trust is partially transitive, so
its value decline according to the distance between the source
user and the destination user. The only initializing parameter
is the maximal propagation distanced.
If user A added userB to his domain, andB addedC,





if n ≤ d
0 if n > d
(1)
Wheren is the distance betweenA and C (n = 2 as there
two steps between them; first step fromA to B, and the
second fromB to C).
d is the maximal propagation distance.
Considerd = 4 then:Tr(A,C) = (4− 2 + 1)/4 = 0.75.
We consider that when a userA accepts an answer of
another userB, thatA trustB. A Moletrust link between both
users is created. While the algorithm is not aware to distrust
so no interpretation exists for unaccepted answers.
C. Subjective logic
Subjective logic (SL) [17] is an extension of probabilistic
logic, which associates each probability with a degree of
uncertainty. Subjective logic allows to build models that trea
with situations of incomplete evidences.
Belief theory [24], [23] is a special case of probability
theory dedicated to treat incomplete knowledge. The sum of
probabilities of possible cases can be less than 1. Subjective
logic [27] offers a belief calculus using a belief metrics called
opinion. The opinion of an individualU about a statementx
is denoted by:
ωUx = (b, d, u, a)
where:b, d, u ∈ [0, 1] are respectively the belief, disbelief and
uncertainty ofU aboutx. The sum of the three values equals
to one (i.eb + d + u = 1). Base ratea ∈ [0, 1] is the prior
probability. Basically, base rate is a statistical measureapplied
in cases of evidences’ absence. For example, when we know
that the percentage of a diseasex in a given population is1%,
then the base rate ofx’s infection is1%. When we meet a new
individual who did not make a test for the disease, a priori we
assume that the probability that he is infected is1%. In social
trust cases, while no a priori statistics are present, we consider
that unknown person has a half chance to be trustworthy. So
we use a base ratea = 0.5. In subjective logic, the base rate
steers the contribution of the uncertainty in the computation
of the probability expectation value according to 2:
E(ωUx ) = b+ a× u (2)
The opinion in subjective logic is based on the accu-
mulation of successful and failed experiences. After each
experience,U updates his opinion aboutx consistently with
experience’s outcome. According to this description, opinion
can be represented as a binary random variable. Beta distri-
bution is normally used to model the behaviour of this kind
of variables. By consequence, the opinion corresponds to the
probability density function (PDF) of beta distribution. PDF
is denoted by two evidence parametersα and β that can be
written as functions of the number of successful and failed
experiences respectively.
α = r +W × a
β = s+W × (1− a)
(3)
wherer is the number of successful experiences (evidences).s
is the number of failed experiences.W is the non-informative
prior weight that ensures that the prior (i.e., whenr = s = 0)
Beta PDF with default base ratea = 0.5 is a uniform PDF
(normallyW = 2).








In subjective logic, the mapping between the opinion
parameters and the beta PDF parameters is given as follows:
b =
r








(r + s+W )
(7)
Table I shows an example of the evolution of an opinion
with successive interactions.
TABLE I: Opinion evolution with successive interactions
No state r s belief disbelief uncertainty
0 no interaction 0 0 0 0 1
1 successful interaction 1 0 1/3 0 2/3
2 failed interaction 1 1 1/4 1/4 2/4
3 successful interaction 2 1 2/5 1/5 2/5
In the first line of Table I, we see the case of absence of
evidences (experiences). The opinion is completely uncertain
(u = 1). In this case, according to 2, the expectation value
equals to the base rate value. The arrival of new experiences,
will make the uncertainty decreases, regardless if these exp -
riences are successful or failed. Successful experiences will
augment the belief, whereas failed experiences will augment
the disbelief.
Subjective logic opinions can be illustrated in the interior
of an equilateral triangle. The three vertices of the triangle are
called belief, disbelief, and uncertainty. The uncertainty axis
links the uncertainty vertex with the opposite edge (the belief-
disbelief edge), the uncertainty value of the opinion is plotted
on this axis considering that its contact with the edge belief-
disbelief represents the value 0, whereas the contact with the
uncertainty vertex represents the value 1. In the same way, we
describe the belief and the disbelief axis.
The opinion is represented by the intersection point of
the three projections on the three axis (belief, disbelief and
certainty) as shown in the example in Fig. 2. The bottom of
the triangle is the probability axis, the probability expectation
value is the projection of the opinion point on the probability
axis with respect to the line linking the uncertainty vertexwith
the base rate point on the probability axis. Fig. 2 illustrates an
example of opinion mapping in subjective logic. The opinion
is represented by a point inside the triangle. The point is the
intersection of the projection of the three valuesb, d, andu
on the axis of belief disbelief and uncertainty, respectively. the
probability expectation valueE(x) is the projection ofωx on
the probability axis directed by the axis linkingax with the
uncertainty edge.
Note that changing the value of base rate can make people
more reckless or more cautious.
After defining the structure of the opinion in subjective
logic, we need to explain some of subjective logic operators
that are useful for building trust network. Local trust networks
are usually represented by a direct graph, where vertices rep-
resent users, and edges represent trust relations. Consequently,
computing trust value between two users is reduced to finding
a path or more connecting them to each other.
Fig. 2: Subjective logic Opinion
1) Trust transitivity: If an individual A trusts another
individualB, andB trustsC, trust transitivity operator is used
to derive the relation betweenA andC.
Subjective logic proposes the uncertainty favouring transi-
tivity. This operator enable the userA to receive the opinion
of a friendC of his trustee friendB, or to ignore the opinion





















































2) Opinion fusion: Suppose in the previous example that
A has another trustee friendD who also trustsC. A has two
separate sources of information aboutC.






























































This operator allows the user to aggregate the opinions of
his trustee friends, regardless if their opinions were contradic-
tory or not.
III. PROPOSEDMODELS
The aim of our models is to predict the most relevant
answer to a given question within a list of answers. Basically,
trust models consider that the person asking tends more to
accept answers written by trustworthy people, so trust models
try to retrieve these users. We have developed three trust aware
models. All of them are based on subjective logic. We refer to
them as local trust model (LTM), which is a classical local trus
model, so it exploits only individual opinions when they are
available, otherwise it exploits collective opinions. Collective
trust model (CTM) which exploits collective opinions all
the time, and global trust model (GTM), which depends on
context-aware reputation scores.
A. Local trust model
This model is basically based on the model proposed in
[28]. It consists of building a local trust network between users.
The edges of this network are SL opinions of users about each
other. Formally, we represent the trust network as a graphG =
(V,E), whereV represents the set of vertices (users), andE
represents the set of edges (direct trust relationships). Suppose
that a usera asks a questionq, a set of usersR will propose
many answers to him. The aim of the trust model is to compute
a score for each userr ∈ R using the trust network. The trust
model estimates thata will accept the answer proposed by the




e(a, r) if e(a, r) ∈ E
∑
j
⊕[e(a, fj)⊗ e(fj , r)] elsewhere
(10)
where:e(a, r) is the direct opinion (edge) ofa in r.
fj is a member ofF , the set of the direct friends ofa, formally:
fj ∈ F :⇐⇒ e(a, fj) ∈ E.
Σ0≤j≤N⊕ is the aggregation of multiple (exactlyN ) opinions.
Note thate(fj , r) itself can be composed of the opinions of
the friends offj .
To predict the accepted answer of a given questionq asked
by the userA, we identifyR the set of users who contributed
answers to the current question. Then, we traverse the graph
(trust network) to compute the local trust between person
asking and each of them. We assume thatA will accept the
answer of the most trustee user withinR. According to this
model,A consults his friends only about members ofR with
whom he has no direct interactions, otherwise considers only
his own opinion. Consulted friends repeat the same strategyin
consulting their friends. The drawback of this model is when
A has only one interaction with a memberr of R, this might
be not enough to evaluate him.A may have a friendB who
has had many interactions withr so more apt to evaluater.
According to this modelA will not ask B about his opinion
in r.
The aim ofA is to rankR by the trustworthiness of its
members. Whenever he has no information about a memberr
of R, A will ask his friends about their opinions in this very
member. So the task of friends is to evaluater without any
farther information. The moreA is connected, the faster is the
1: procedure INDIVIDUAL TRUST(A,B)
2: if (e(A,B) ∈ E) then
3: return e(A,B)
4: else
5: e(A,B)← e(0, 0, 1) ⊲ a neutral opinion
6: for all f ∈ A.friends do





Fig. 3: Individual trust function
model, since the probability to have direct relationships with
the members ofR becomes higher. The pseudo code 3 shows
how this model works in demanding friends’ opinions.
B. Collective trust
This model is based on collective opinions instead of
personal opinions. In the previous model, collective opinions
were used only in the case of absence of personal opinions.
In this model, collective opinions are used in all cases. This
semantically means thatA will ask his friends about all the


















⊕[e(a, fj)⊗ e(fj , r)]
if e(a, r) ∈ E
∑
j
⊕[e(a, fj)⊗ e(fj , r)]
elsewhere
(11)
This model assumes that direct interactions are frequently
unable to assure sufficient information about users. In the
previous model, user could supply a personal opinion about
another user once he has at least one interaction with him. We
think that this affects the quality of the opinion, because of the
lack of experience. In the current model, user aggregates his
opinion with the his friends’ opinions, each friend’s opinio is
conditioned by the trust given to him by the active user. This
means that we always need to traverse the graph, which can
be time consuming in large graphs. We alleviate this problem
by building a graph by domain in our data.
Example:
Back to the same example in Section II. Fig. 5 illustrates
trust network extracted from the described relations in the
example. So whenA asks a question to which she get replies
from E, F and G, thenR = E,F,G. A needs to rank the
members ofR to identify the most trustworthy member.




[e(A,B)⊗ e(B,F )]⊕[e(A,C)⊗ e(C,D)⊗ e(D,F )]
1: procedure COLLECTIVETRUST((A,R))
2: Declarescores[R]
3: for all score ∈ scores do score = e(0, 0, 1) ⊲
neutral opinion
4: end for
5: for all (r ∈ R do
6: if opinion(A, r) ∈ E then
7: scores[r] = e(A, r)⊗ scores(r)
8: end if
9: end for
10: for all f ∈ A.friends do
11: fscore = collectiveTrust(f,R)
12: for all r ∈ R do





Fig. 4: Collective trust function
score(G) = e(A,C)⊗ e(C,G)
As for the collective trust model, the scores ofF andG
do not change, but the score ofE becomes as follows:
score(E) = [e(A,E)]⊕[e(A,B)⊗ e(B,E)]
Now let us add a link betweenC andF , and see the effect
of such a link:
In individual trust model:
score(F ) = [e(A,B)⊗ e(B,F )]⊕[e(A,C)⊗ e(C,F )]
In collective trust model:
score(F ) = [e(A,B)⊗ e(B,F )]⊕[[e(A,C)⊗
e(C,F )]⊕[e(A,C)⊗ e(C,D)⊗ e(D,F )]]
Once again, we see that in individual trust model, whenA
asksC about his opinion inF , asC has a direct link withF ,
he his response toA is based only on this direct link. Whereas
i collective trust model, for the same case,C asksD about
this last’s opinion aboutF , and return toA the aggregation of
the opinionD conditioned by the trust betweenC andD, and
C ’s own opinion.
C. Global trust model (GTM)
Each question in stackexchange has a set of associated
keywords. We use these keywords to build a new global trust
model (GTM), that exploits the reputation of users towards
keywords. When a userA accepts the answer of a userB to
his question, a link is created or updated betweenB and each
of the keywords associated to the question, so we do not use
neither a graph nor user to user connections. The semantic
signification of the links between users and keywords is the
experience of the user towards the keyword, so a reputed user
towards a keyword can also be called expert. The profile of a
user is represented by a hashtable where keys are the keywords
Fig. 5: Trust graph
and the values are subjective logic opinions to express his
experience related to the keywords.
To predict the accepted answer of a given questionQ asked
by the userA, we identifyR the set of users who contributed
answers to the current question, and the setK of keywords
associated to the question. We compute the average reputation
score to each member ofR towards the elements ofK. The
member with the highest average score is chosen to be the
owner of the accepted answer.
In (LTM) and (CTM) only friends and their friends can
influence the decision of the person asking, and their influence
is limited by the trust that the person asking accord to each
them. In the current model, all the users in the dataset can
influence the reputation score of the members ofR without
conditions. This can affect the robustness of the model to
malicious attacks.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL WORK
We use the dataset of the website stackoverflow. The web-
site offers a question answering forum for multiple domains,
mainly but not limited to computer science. The available
data contains 30 domains. Users subscribe to the website by
domain, so one user can have multiple accounts, according
to the number of domains in which he participates. The total
number of accounts is 374,008 for about 153,000 users.
The user asks a question in a given domain, and associates
a set of keywords to his question, then he receives many
answers. He chooses the most relevant answer to him and
attributes an ”accepted answer” label to it. Nevertheless,u ers
can keep proposing new answers. Subsequent users who have
the same problem as the person asking can take advantage of
the answers and rate them on their usefulness by attributing
thumb-up or thumb-down. In the available dataset, we have
access to only the total number of thumbs-up and the total
number of thumbs-down an answer has, but no information
about suppliers’ identities. The website offers the possibility
to order answers by relevance, where the accepted answer is
put in the top of the list, followed by the other answers ordere
by the difference between thumbs-up count and thumbs-down
count. Our work aims to use trust based models to predict
the accepted answer over the set of available answers. Total
number of questions in current dataset equals to 371,594, for
a total number of answers 816,487. We divide the questions of
each domain in five equivalent sets. Then, we apply a crossing
test in five iterations, in each iteration we use four sets for
learning and building the trust network and the fifth for testing
the prediction quality.
A. Interpreting interactions
In stackoverflow, when a userA asks a question, he
receives a list of answers from many users.A can accept
only one answer. Unaccepted answers are not necessarily bad
ones. They might be simply not good enough compared to
the accepted one. They even might be better but arrived too
late andA has already accepted another satisfactory answer.
Basically, while we do not have an explicit reaction fromA
towards the unaccepted answers, we suppose four hypotheses
to treat them:
1) rigorous hypothesis: unaccepted answers are consid-
ered as failed interactions.
2) ignoring hypothesis: unaccepted answers are not con-
sidered at all.
3) independent subjective hypothesis: in both previous
methods, the interaction value is either +1 (success-
ful), or -1 (failed). In this method, we introduce
relatively successful/failed interactions. We use the
rates of community towards the answer to estimate a
subjective successful/failure of the interaction. In fact,
the thumb-up represents a successful interaction with
an unknown user, same thing for the thumb-down
with a failed interaction. The global reaction of the
community towards the answer is subjective opinion
resulting from members’ interactions with the answer.
We consider the expectation value of the community’s
opinion as the value of the partially successful/failure
of the interaction between the person asking and the
replier.
4) dependent subjective hypothesis: regarding to the fact
that a user can give a thumb-up for an answer because
it is better/worse than others, the attribution of thumb-
up and thumb-down can be relative too. The reason
why we propose another subjective method where
our certainty is influenced by the global number of
thumb-up and thumb-down attributed to all answers
of the same question. In this case, the opinion about
an answer is dependent on the the other opinions









whereth is an absolute value of thumb (up or down).
j is the current answer.
n is the number of answers of the current question.
The default non-informative prior weight W is nor-
mally defined as W = 2 because it produces a uniform
Beta PDF in case of default base rate a = 1/2.
The three components of the opinion are:







j thup is the number of thumbs up attributed
to the answer.







j thdown is the number of thumbs down
attributed to the answer.
uncertaintyj = 1− certaintyj
Finally, we compute the expectation value of the
resulting opinion and consider it as the value of the
relative success/failure interaction.
V. EVALUATION
Our comparison includes three axes. The first one is the
precision of prediction. The second is the complexity, which
indicates the execution time of each model. The third is the
robustness to malicious attacks.
A. Precision
Evaluation Metrics: We consider the problem of finding
the accepted answer as a list ranking problem with one relevant
item. Mean reciprocal rank (MRR) is a quality metrics used to
evaluate systems that have to give out a ranked list with only
one relevant item. Reciprocal rank (RR) of question is1/r
where r is the rank given by the evaluated algorithm to the
accepted answer. Mean reciprocal rank is the mean value of
RR’s to all questions. The value of this metrics varies betwen
0 and 1, where 1 is the best precision score.
MRR is a good indicator to the performance of prediction
algorithms for ranked lists. Nevertheless, we think that itis not
perfectly adapted to our case. MRR is usually used for systems
that have to predict a list of items within which a relevant
item exists. We are trying to find the accepted answer by re-
ranking an existing list of answers. Remark the case when the
algorithm ranks the relevant item in the last position of the
list, the algorithm is recompensed for at least having chosen
the item within the list. In our case, the list is predefined, so the
algorithm should not be recompensed for ranking the relevant
item at the end of the list. The range of RR values is[1/r, 1],
we propose a modified version where the value varies between
1 if the relevant item is in the top of the list, and 0 if it is at
the end of the list. We call this metrics mean predefined lists





where:N is the size of the list.
MPLR is the average of PLRs for all questions. We employ
a modified competition ranking strategy, so the ranking gap is
left before theex aequoitems. For example, if two items on
the top of the list have the same score, they are considered
both second, and no item is put at the top of the list.







Rigorous - 0.57 0.88 0.884
Ignoring 0.53 0.58 0.75 0.7
Dependent
probabilistic
- 0.62 0.87 0.815
Independent
probabilistic
- 0.617 0.86 0.78







Rigorous - 0.37 0.85 0.85
Ignoring 0.3 0.36 0.69 0.6
Dependent
probabilistic
- 0.442 0.84 0.76
Independent
probabilistic
- 0.438 0.83 0.73
Results and discussions:Only questions with accepted
answer and more than one proposed answer are appropriate
for our test. The corpus contains 118,778 appropriate questions
out of the 371,594 questions of the corpus.
As MoleTrust is not probabilist and does not consider the
distrust, only the ignoring hypothesis is applicable on it.Table
II illustrates the MRR scores of the four models, and Table III
illustrates MPLR scores. MPLR scores are, of course, lower
than those of MRR. Nevertheless, both tables lead to the same
conclusions.
Obviously, all the SL models are more precise than
MoleTrust, which guarantee certain improvement to the SL
compared to the referential model.
Concerning the SL models, it is obvious that the precision
of CTM and GTM surpass widely that of LTM.
Basically, the truster in LTM builds his belief by mainly
exploiting his own interactions. Whereas, CTM leans fully
on collective opinions that rely on more complete evidences
than individual ones. Trustee friends enrich collective opinions
by more knowledge, that make them more reliable and accu-
rate. These results show the limit of individual opinions and
local relationships, because direct interactions can be poorly
informative, and relying only on them can lead to inaccurate
decisions. A fellow in a social environment needs always to
integrate and interact within communities to be more informed,
and more capable to adjust his decisions.
GTM offers a larger archive of interactions to the trusters.
Truster in GTM has access to all the past interactions of
the trustee, so construct a more elaborated belief about him.
The performance of GTM is largely better than LTM. On
the other hand, it is less precise than CTM even though it
makes use of more evidences. We assume that sometimes these
supplementary evidences cause information overload, and tend
to be noisier than profitable. In addition, GTM accord the same
weight to the opinions of all participants, whether they were
trustees or not form the active user perspectives.
We would refer to the difference in context consideration.
LTM and CTM consider the domain of the question as a
context. GTM considers a more refined interpretation of the
context, based on a sub-domain defined by the tags associated
to the question. The context in GTM is very adaptive, this
leads to a more specific person having competences in this
exact context. The presence of this person in the list of people
who answered the question proves his willingness to assist
the person asking, his competence and mastery of subject lead
him to be the owner of the accepted answer. For example, ifB
was able to answer a question ofA about Java programming
language, this does not mean that he would be able the next
time to reply to a question about C++ programming language,
although it is still the same domain (context) for LTM and
CTM. So even within the same domain, people might be
experts in narrow sub-domains, while having a general or even
weak knowledge about the other parts of the domain. IfA
tried to reply the question ofB about C++, only GTM will
detect that he is not the best person to reply in the domain of
”c++ programming”, whereas LTM and CTM will consider
him a good candidate because he is trustee in the domain
of ”programming”. Current precision score do not allow to
evidently evaluate the influence of both consideration.
In real life, regret can assist to re-establish trust. The
structure of local trust systems does not possess any mech-
anism to reconsider relationship after a bad integration with a
destination user (which can be occasional), collective opini ns
allow the reconsideration of the relation with this user if he
was trustee by intermediate friends of source user.
Regarding the four hypotheses about treating unaccepted
answers in LTM, we find that probabilistic methods are slighty
better than both rigorous and ignoring hypotheses. In CTM and
GTM, the three hypotheses that try to infer from unaccepted
answers surpass the performance of the forth that neglects
these information (ignoring hypothesis). We conclude that
unaccepted answers can be profitable, and then should not
be neglected. Extracting information from these answers is
possible thanks to the flexibility of subjective logic. This
framework proves again its capability to deal with incomplete
evidence cases.
B. Complexity
Complexity is an important issue to evaluate algorithms.
The importance of complexity evaluation is to estimate the
time needed for each model to be executed. A good rec-
ommender must be able to generate recommendation in a
reasonable delay.
Algorithm complexity is a function oft(n), wheren is
the input size. The complexity function gives a clue about the
expected execution time of the algorithm given an input of size
n. Complexity calculus is independent from the hardware, the
programming language, the compiler and the implementation
details. It takes in consideration only the elementary operations
of the algorithm such as: variable assignment(t(n) = 1),
comparison(t(n) = 1), loop on a list of sizen (t(n) = n),
comparing all the values of an array to each other(t(n) = n2),
traversing a graph (t n) = V +E), whereV is the number of
vertices, andE is the number of edges).
The big O notation is used to refer to the complexity, this
notation keeps only the elementary element that maximize the
algorithm complexity. For example, having an algorithm with
(t(n) = n2 + 4 · n + 2), the equivalent in big O notation is
O(n) = n2.
Generally, the evaluation of complexity takes into account
the worst case and the average case. The worst case represents
the upper bound of time needed to execute the algorithm, and
the average case is the lower bound.
Graph traversal complexity equals toO(V + E). In the
worst case, MoleTrust, LTM and CTM have to execute this
operationR times, whereR is the number of users who
have proposed answers to the question. By consequence, the
complexity of these three models equals toO(R · (V + E)).
The complexity of the GTM isO(R · L), whereL is the size
of the list of keywords with which the member ofR has a
reputation score.
In the worst case, MoleTrust, LTM and CTM have the same
complexity. We can consider that the GTM is less complex
whereasL is usually smaller thanV + E.
As the worst case is mostly infrequent, it is usually
accompanied by the average case complexity. We defineR′
as the subset ofR that contains the users having no direct
trust relationship with the active user, soR′ ⊆ R. The average
complexity of LTM is O(R′ · (V + E)). It is obvious that
average complexity of CTM is the same as its worst case
complexity. The average complexity MoleTrust is less than
LTM and CTM, because it stops searching when it finds the
first member ofR. Basically the average complexity of the
GTM equals also toO(R · L) when using lists. The average
complexity of hashtables isO(1).
Finally, from the perspective of complexity we find that
GTM is the less complex, followed by LTM, and CTM is
the most complex one, so the most time consuming. This
complexity analyses illustrates the limitation of CTM for the
applications with huge graphs.
C. Robustness against malicious attacks
In a malicious group attack scenario, we distinguish three
groups of users. The attackers who participate in the execution
of the attack. The affected users whose recommendations are
contaminated because of the attack. And the pure users who
are untouched by the attack.
In the group attack many profiles cooperate to achieve
the attack’s goal. These profiles can be possessed by one or
more user, they unite to improve the score of one or more
of them to a point that they can control the recommendations
generated to other users. In the current application a group
of profiles might ally together to execute a group attack.
The members of group keep mutually inserting questions,
answering them, and accepting each others’ answers. While
the application is contextualized, and the trust models treat
the domains separately, attackers must target a given domain
or repeat the same operation for each domain.
GTM is weak to this kind of attacks. The group can aug-
ment the reputation score of its members for chosen keywords,
and contaminate them. Hence, when any pure user asks a
question containing contaminated keywords, he will become
affected and receive a contaminated recommendation from the
attackers.
In MoleTrust, the local and the collective models, the topol-
ogy of the graph assists to isolate the group of attackers. The
communitarian behaviour will make them highly connected
to each other but weakly connected to other users. Hence,
a pure user can not be affected unless he decides himself
to trust one or more attackers, which is very unlikely. Even
if this happens once by accident, the resulting link is not
strong enough (especially in CTM), because it is based on
one interaction, and it will be more uncertain than other links,
so with weak influence.
In [36], the authors propose the bottleneck property to state
about the robustness of a trust model to the group attack. The
meaning of the bottleneck property is that when having a trust
relation s → t, wheres is a pure user andt is an attacker,
this relation is not significantly affected by the successorof t.
Fig. 6 illustrates an attacked graph with a bottleneck property.
The edges in our models are formed of SL opinions. So
the only way to strengthen this relation, is by more successful
interactions betweens and t, which is decided bys himself.
To summarize, in local and collective model, the attack can
succeed only when pure users decide deliberately to trust
attackers.
The conclusion of this analysis is that the global model
is weaker than the local and the collective models against
malicious group attacks.
Fig. 6: The bottleneck phenomena in the trust graph
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we compared three different interpretations
of computational trust model.
We effected a comparison that consists of three axes
(precision, complexity, and robustness). Fig. 7 resumes th
conclusions. In terms of precision, we showed the limits of
individual opinions compared to collective and global ones.
Using opinions based on evidences from multiple resources is
more fruitful, with some reservations to information overload
limits. We represent that in Fig. 7, by putting CTM and GTM
closer to the precision circle than LTM.
Although CTM has the best precision score, it still the most
complex model among the three studied model. In Fig. 7, GTM
Fig. 7: The triple evaluation of the three trust models
and LTM are closer to the circle of complexity, because they
have a better (lower) complexity. Even though GTM is less
complex than LTM.
GTM forms a compromise between precision and com-
plexity. Yet, its weak point is in the robustness axe. It is
theoretically weaker than the other two models. In Fig. 7, itis
located far from the robustness circle.
Our study puts the light on a weak point of each model. So
the choice of a model is still dependant on the type application,
the context and the desired characteristics.
Some of our results are theoretically inferred (the robust-
ness issue). We are interested in proving that empirically,by
simulating malicious attacks on the dataset, in order to measur
the influence of these attacks on the precision of each model.
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